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US POLITICAL CORRUPTION: IDENTIFYING THE CHANNELS
OF BRIBES FOR FIRMS FINANCIAL POLICIES 
 
This paper presents for the first time evidence on ‘channel-based’ firm corruption in the US
over the period 2000-2010. By employing conviction, type of bribery, ethnicity firm-level data,
and  two  alternative  panel  econometric  approaches  for  robustness,  the  empirical  analysis
documents first, that the cash payment channel dominates bribery activities in relevance to firm
financial policies, while ethnicity groups do matter in exemplifying the role of those channels,
with the Anglo-Saxon group dominating such activities.  The results  could be of substantial
importance for regulators and legal corporate authorities in developing ways not only to capture
corruption activities, but also to mitigate them. 
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In  a  recent  paper  published  in  the  Journal  of  Financial  Economics,  Smith  (2016)
provides evidence that US firms in highly corrupted areas hold less cash and incur more
leverage, while the latter association gets stronger across firms that operate primarily
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for private gain (Leite and Weidemann, 2002), while bribery is the paying of informal
gifts or money to speed up the regulatory process or to bypass regulation. The definition
of bribery covers various types of corruption, running from a police officer overlooking
a traffic offence by an individual in return for a bribe, to the manipulating of financial
statements in order to hide the theft of funds.  
 Bribery is turning into an increasingly important concern, both for governments and for
firms. In a survey paper, D’Souza and Kaufmann (2010) provide evidence that, in 2006,
11% of OECD firms reported that ‘firms like theirs’ bribe in other OECD countries,
26% of OECD firms reported bribery in  poorly governed developing countries,  and
50% of firms located in low-income countries reported bribery in their home country.
Despite the presence of a huge literature on bribery, there is little direct evidence on the
types of bribes the firms pay. This is not surprising given that bribery activities are
usually undisclosed. At the same time, there is little analysis of direct firm-level data,
with firm-level evidence coming from surveys (Svensson, 2003; Cull and Xu, 2005;
Fisman and Svensson, 2007). 
 The goal of this research is to extend Smith’s findings by providing evidence on the
channels  through which bribes  are  paid,  spanning the period  2000-2010.  The paper
could further contribute to the literature on firm financial policies in relevance to the
drivers of corporate liquidity (Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999), as well as those of
debt policy (Foley et al., 2007; Duchin, 2010; Graham and Leary, 2011.Hoberg et al.,
2014).  This  study  is  also  close  to  the  strand  of  the  literature  on  the  link  between
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corruption and firm financial policies. Fan et al. (2012) and Capria et al. (2013) provide
cross-country  supportive  evidence  for  that  link,  while  Mironov  (2015)  generates  a
metric of corruption which allows him to explore how corrupt managers display better
performances for the firms they manage. This paper also uses conviction data which is
an additional novelty, while it continues the within-country study approach that reflects
the strict control over both institutional and cultural differences that are eminent across
countries. 
 The main strand of the corruption literature focuses on the determinants 
influencing corruption within a cross-section of countries. This literature has uncovered
determinants, such as the proportion of women in parliament, the quality of the civil
service,  and the labour force (Swamy et al.,  2001), higher relative wages for public
officials  (Van  Rijckeghem  and  Weder,  1997),  and  a  common  law  legal  system
(Treisman, 2000). Svensson (2003) introduces a modelling approach to understand the
drivers which impact bribery, both in terms of the occurrence of bribery and in terms of
the amount paid as a bribe. Public officials have the ability to demand payments from
firms. This ability stems from their ‘control rights’ over the firm, that is, the extent to
which  the  firm  is  bound  by  regulation  to  approach  public  officials  for  public
goods/services  required  in  the  course  of  business.  These  services  include:  business
licenses; customs clearances;  power grid connections;  and special  operating permits.
These  control  rights  mean  that  public  officials  are  capable  of  potentially  affecting
business decisions and cash flows in relevance to the firm’s operations. The level of
control rights that these officials have depends on the extent to which their decisions
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drivers of corruption, the giving of informal payments and the size of these gifts. The
first of these is linked to the level  of required contact  that the firm has with public
officials, i.e. the control rights hypothesis. By contrast, the amount of bribe that is paid
is linked to the firm’s ability to pay and refusal power (bargaining power). Whilst the
results are statistically significant, his analysis suffers from a relatively small sample
size.  
Delavallade (2011) explores the link between tax evasion and bribery. He adds
to previous literature which finds bribery and tax evasion to be substitutes (firms leave
the formal sector in order to avoid bribes; and firms in the formal sector are less able to
escape being targeted for bribes). By contrast, Rand and Tarp (2010) argue that their
relationship  might  be  complementary,  while  Johnson  et  al.  (2000)  illustrate  that
companies might pay bribes to tax officials in order to be allowed to hide their sales.
Fan et al. (2010) show that different types of corruption can have different effects on the
economy, while economic agents might settle for certain types of corruption as a second
best option due to the worse effects  of other types.  This variability in the nature of
corruption can also be applied to bribery in a sense that different types of bribery might
have  different  drivers.  Due  to  the  variety  of  activities  which  may  involve  a  bribe
payment, having to pay bribes is open to different interpretations which might lead to a
bias in the responses of firms. 
To briefly foreshadow the empirical findings, the empirical analysis reports two
primary results. First, the main channel through which bribery occurs is that of cash
payments, followed by donation, gifts and hiring. Second, tests on the role of ethnicity
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with respect to those channels illustrate that cash payments are mostly associated with
the Anglo-Saxon and Hispanic ethnicity groups, while Indian and Chinese ethnicities
are  mostly  associated  with  the  channels  of  donation  and gifts.  Finally,  Korean and
Vietnamese ethnicities seem to be highly associated with the channel of hiring.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes our data,
while  Section 2 presents the empirical  results  on the channels through which bribes
affect financial policies in US firms. Section 3 reports new empirical findings based on
the ethnicity background of those being involved in the bribes business, and finally,
Section 4 concludes. 
1. Data 
The analysis makes use of the same data set used by Smith (2016). The data set includes
all  firms  incorporated  in  the  US,  while  it  excludes  financial  firms  [with  SIC
classification codes 6000-6999] and utilities [with SIC classification codes 4900-4999].
It also follows Smith (2016) by including corruption around firm headquarters. Data
were obtained from 
Compustat.  The final  sample includes  a  panel  of  14,537 firms,  spanning the period
20002010. Our covered period differs from that in Smith (2016) due to data availability
concerning the channels of bribes. 
 In terms of the dependent variable, the firm’s cash ratio is used, defined as cash and
cash equivalents divided by total assets, while for leverage, the analysis makes use of
book leverage, defined as debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt over assets. In
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convictions  from each  federal  judicial  district  within  the  US.  The  analysis  follows
Smith’s approach on matching firms to corruption data, by converting ZIP codes from
Compustat  to  their  respective  Federal  Information  Processing  Standard  codes,  with
convictions being matched to contemporaneous financial  data.  The methodology has
been also received wide support in the literature (Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Bucler et al.,
2009). Data on conviction come from the US Department  of Justice,  and especially
from the Public Integrity Section (PIN). The bribery department is our interest,  with
responses on how the bribery occurred classified as donations, gifts, hiring and cash
payments. To this end, four dummy variables are defined: Donations which takes one if
bribery occurred through donations, and zero otherwise; Gifts which takes one if bribery
occurred through gifts, and zero otherwise; Hiring which takes one if bribery occurred
through hiring, and zero otherwise; and finally, Payments which takes one if bribery
occurred through cash payments, and zero otherwise. The classification can be directly
found directly from the US Department of Justice. 
             The analysis also makes use of the majority of the control variables used in 
Smith’s (2016) study and they are: market-to-book value (MBV), cash flows measured
as EBITDA minus taxes minus interest minus dividends divided by book assets (CF),
net working capital measured as net working capital net of cash scaled by book assets
(NWC), capital expenses measured as capital expenses divided by book assets (CAP),
firm’s  size  measured  by  the  firm’s  total  assets  (TA),  dividends  measured  as  cash
dividends divided by book assets (DIV), R&D expenses measured as R&D expenses
divided  by  sales  (RD),  acquisitions  measured  as  cash  outflows  in  relevance  to
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acquisitions divided by book assets (ACQ), sales (SALES), Altman’s Z measured as the
probability of bankruptcy (Z), EBITDA measured as EBITDA divided by total assets
(EBITDA), firms’ age measured as the number of months the firm is registered with the
Research in Security Prices database (AGE), CF Sigma defined as industry standard
deviation of cash flows for ten years prior, with industry being defined by two-digit SIC
(SIGMA), the degree of market concentration for the sector of the firm measured by the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the three-digit SIC level (HHI), inventory measured as
inventory divided by book assets  (INV), per capita  income (PC),  population  (POP),
negative income measured as an indicator equal to one if the firm had negative net
income at year t, and zero otherwise (NI), net debt issuance measured as sales of debt
minus purchases of debt divided by book assets (NDI), net equity issuance measured as
sales of equity minus purchases of equity divided by book assets (NEI), percentage of
firms’ operation in the headquarters measured as the percentage of the firm’s operations
in the state in which its headquarters are located (HQ), and unemployment measured as
the country-level unemployment rate with data coming from Datastream (UN). 
2. Empirical Analysis 
The hypothesis we aim to test is that how four different channels in relevance to the
mechanisms  bribes  materialize  affect  firms’  financial  policies.  With  data  on  firms
indexed by i at time t, the analysis could in principle test the hypothesis as follows: 
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where cash is defined as the cash ratio and leverage as book leverage. Donations, Gifts,
Hiring and Payments are dummy variables in case that the bribes are paid in the form of
donation, gifts, hiring, and cash payments, respectively. X’ is a control variable vector
that includes the majority of variables introduced in Smith (2016) and defined above in
the data section. Finally, eit represents the error term. 
The empirical analysis applies a panel methodology which takes into account
both cross-section and time dimensions of the data to estimate the long-run relationship
described in Equation (1). When the errors of a panel regression are cross-sectionally
correlated,  then standard estimation methodologies can lead to inconsistent estimates
and  incorrect  inference  (Phillips  and  Sul,  2003).  In  order  to  avoid  any  potential
estimations problems due to the presence of cross-dependence, the empirical analysis
implements a novel econometric methodology, namely, the Common Correlated Effects
(CCE) by Pesaran (2006). The proposed methodology allows individual specific errors
to  be  serially  correlated  and  heteroskedastic.  Pesaran  (2006)  adopts  a  multifactor
residual model, such as: 
cashit or leverageit = a + b1 Donations + b2 Gifts + b3 Hiring + b4 Payments + c X’it + eit  
           (1) 
eit = λ’iFt + uit          (2) 
where subscript it is the ith cross section observation at time t, for  and i 
.   is the mx1 vector of unobserved common factors. Pesaran (2006) 
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considers the case of weakly stationary factors. However, Kapetanios et al. (2011) show
that  Pesaran’s  CCE  approach  continues  to  yield  consistent  estimation  and  valid
inference even when common factors are unit root processes (I(1)).  
Table 1 reports the results when the dependent variable is the cash ratio. Three
alternative models are reported: Model (1) which has only the convictions variable as a
single independent variable, Model (2) in which the four dummies associated with the
channel of paying bribe have been added, and Model (3) in which all the full set of the
remaining  control  variables  has  been  included.  All  models  contain  firm,  time  and
industry  fixed  effects.  In  terms  of  Model  (1),  the  findings  indicate  the  presence  of
negative and statistically significant (at 1%) impact of convictions on firm cash holding.
In terms of Model (2), the findings illustrate the statistical significance of the donations,
gifts  and  cash  payments  channel,  while  the  hiring  channel  indicates  the  weakest
association with the cash ratio. The results also indicate the negative effect of those
channels on the cash holding ratio for the firm. These findings remain robust in the case
of Model (3), when all control variables are considered. Their sign and size remain close
to  those  reported  in  Smith  (2016).  Furthermore,  these  findings  document  that  the
channel for bribes occurs more strongly in relevance to the cash payments mechanism,
followed by those of donations and gifts. The results remain robust across Models (2)
and (3).   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 reports the results in the case where the dependent variable is leverage. Once
again,  the  same  versions  of  the  modelling  approach  used  in  Table  1  have  been
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with the results remaining robust in the two other versions of the modelling approach. In
Model 2, the channels of bribery indicate the presence of a positive (and statistically
significant) association between them and leverage, with the channel of cash payments
indicating the strongest impact on leverage, followed by the donations channel. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
This part of the empirical analysis uses system General Method of Moments (GMM),
developed and modified by Arrelano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998),
to estimate alternatively Equation (1) as system GMM handles well with endogeneity of
the regressors by generating instruments from the lag value of the regressors. System
GMM helps  to  avoid  dynamic  panel  bias  by instrumenting  endogenous explanatory
variables by using their own lagged values. Moreover, two-step system GMM provides
more  efficient  estimators  over  one-step  system  GMM,  both  become  asymptotically
equivalent when the disturbances are spherical (Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
The new findings  are  illustrated  in  Tables  3 and 4.  They provide supportive
evidence of the previous findings, albeit in lower sizes, thus, exemplifying again the
role of the cash payments channel through which bribes seem to affect firm financial
policies. 
For  validity  of  the  instruments,  we  need  to  reject  the  test  for  second-order
autocorrelation [AR(2)] in disturbances (Arrelano and  Bond, 1991). Moreover, we need
to reject the null hypothesis of difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instruments.
It is evident from both Table 3 and 4 that both the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) of
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disturbances and the difference-in-Hansen tests fail to reject the respective nulls. Thus,
these tests support the validity of the instruments used, while difference-in-Hansen tests
imply  exogeneity  of  these  instruments.  The  tables  also  report  Hansen  tests  for
overidentifying restrictions, which outperform Sargan tests in the case of the two-step
system GMM. In the estimation process the instruments were generated as we used two
lags for levels and three lags for difference in the variables. However, as the number of
instruments  used  in  the  relevant  estimations  was  far  lower  than  the  number  of
observation, it did not cause any identification problem, as reflected in the Hansen test.
The reported Hansen test results also fail to detect any problem in the validity of the
instruments used in these estimates. Overall, all these diagnostics recommend that the
estimates are correctly instrumented,  while the estimated coefficients are reliable for
inference. 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
3. The Role of Ethnicity for the Channels of Bribery  
This part of the empirical analysis explores whether the ethnicity of firm managers has
any impact on the channels of bribery identified above. Micro-level data on ethnicity
are obtained from the same conviction database as above. There has been evidence for
the link between ethnicity and patronage provided by Burgess et al. (2011) and Do et al.
(2013).  Both  of  these  studies  tell  a  story  about  individuals  in  power  passing  on
resources to members of their own ethnic group instead of the population as a whole.
Whilst some evidence exists for politicians allocating resources to other ethnic groups,
this seems to be driven by a need to get more votes in order to win an election, rather
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the construction of roads in areas dominated by people of the same ethnicity as the
political  leader  whilst  Do et  al.  (2013) argue about the distribution of resources,  by
promoted officials in Vietnam, to their home districts. The flipside of this is that some
individuals might extort people from other ethnic groups while choosing not to do so to
members  of  their  own  ethnic  group.  Ethnic  diversity  can  directly  affect  economic
choices  through:  preferences,  strategies  (Greif,  1993),  and  the  production  function
(Alesina et al., 2003). Results from the social identity literature suggest that individuals
might  derive  utility  from the  wellbeing  of  members  of  their  own ethnic  group and
disutility  from the  well  being  of  members  of  other  ethnic  groups  (Alesina  and  La
Ferrara, 2000).  
From the database of the convicted officials, information on ethnic surnames of
firms’  managers  was  obtained  and  it  came  from  two  sources.  First,  the  database
constructed by Kerr (2008), which lists the 100 most common surnames for Chinese,
Indian, Japanese, Korean, Russian, Hispanic, and Vietnamese. Obviously, the remaining
surnames  are  associated  with  Anglo-Saxon  backgrounds  (including  both  White  and
Black people). Overall, these seven ethnicities/groups are used because they represent
important subgroups that are active in the U.S. firms. Preliminary statistics indicate that
the most common ethnicity is in relevance to White (mostly Anglo/Saxon) with 44%,
followed by Indians (18%), Chinese (15%) and Hispanic (13%). These statistics show
that ethnicity could play an important role in the bribery business. A similar case has




For empirically purposes the following dummy variables are defined: dumCH,
dumIN, dum KO, dumRUS, dum HIS, dum VIET and dumAS, which take the value of
one  in  case  the  ethnicity  background  is  associated  with  Chinese,  Indian,  Korean,
Russian,  Hispanic,  Vietnamese  and  Anglo-Saxon  backgrounds,  respectively.  In  this
case, Equation (1) is enhanced by interactive terms in relevance both to the channel
dummies and to ethnicity dummies and turns out to be: 
cashit or leverageit = a + b1 Donations + b2 Gifts + b3 Hiring + b4 Payments + c X’it 
+  b5 Donations x dumCH + b6 Donations x IND + b7 Donations x KO +  b8 
Donations1 x dumRUS + b9 Donations x dumHIS + b10 Donations x dumVIET +  b11 
Donations x dumAS + b12 Gifts x dumCH + b13 Gifts x IND + b14 Gifts x KO +  b15 
Gifts x dumRUS + b16 Gifts x dumHIS + b17 Gifts x dumVIET + b18 Gifts x dumAS + 
b19 Hiring x dumCH + b20 Hiring x IND + b21 Hiring x KO + b22 Hiring x dumRUS + 
b23 Hiring x dumHIS + b24 Hiring x dumVIET + b25 Hiring x dumAS + b26 Payments x 
dumCH + b27 Payments x IND + b28 Payments x KO +  b29 Payments x dumRUS + b30
Payments x dumHIS + b31 Payments x dumVIET +  
b32 Payments x dumAS + vit         (2) 
The results with the ethnicity dummies are reported in Tables 5 and 6. In terms of the
cash financial policies, the findings in Table 5 illustrate the presence of a negative effect
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that all types of ethnicities considered, except that of the Korean, are involved with the
popular venue of bribes in relevance to cash payments, while hiring remains a very
unpopular  channel  in  which  only  the  results  in  association  with  the  Anglo-Saxon
ethnicity seem to weakly affect cash financial policies. In terms of the gifts channel,
both the Hispanic and the Korean ethnicities seem not to be involved in this type of
bribery, while in terms of the donations channel only the Anglo-Saxon, Chinese and
Indian ethnicities  seem to value it  for their  bribes business. Finally,  in terms of the
findings reported in Table 6, the ethnicity background seems also to be important for the
bribery channels, with the cash payment channel maintaining its significance across all
ethnic groups under investigation. 
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
4. Conclusion  
This paper examined the link of different bribery channels with firms’ financial policies,
i.e. cash and leverage policies, using conviction data from the US, spanning the period
2000-2010. Its main contribution was to lay out, for the first time, empirical evidence on
the mechanisms that bribery occurs in US firms. The analysis established two primary
empirical facts. After considering four alternative bribery channels, i.e. donation, gifts,
hiring and cash payments, the first fact indicated that for both types of firms’ financial
policies,  the  cash payments  channel  dominated,  followed by the  donations  channel,
while hiring was illustrated to be the weakest channel for the bribery activities. Second,
the analysis considered the potential role of different ethnicity groups in relevance to
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these bribery channels. The findings indicated that certain ethnicity groups are closer
associated  with  these  channels,  with  the  cash  payment  channel  associated  with  the
AngloSaxon  ethnicity  group  dominating  the  effect  on  both  types  of  firm  financial
policies. 
 The  results  could  have  significant  implications  for  regulators  to  understand  the
channels  through  which  bribery  occurs  and  affects  firms’  financial  policies.  The
identification of those channels could potentially offer ways that the government might
expedite  the  decline  in  corruption.  Governments  in  general  could  focus  on
improvements  in governance (Fisman and Werker,  2010).  In addition,  strengthening
further property rights so that firms can be motivated to further recoup the value of their
entrepreneur activities and thus avoid being involved in corruption activities. 
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Wadhwa,  V.,  Saxenian,  A.,  Rissing,  B.  and  Gereffi,  G.  (2007).  ‘America's  new





Common Correlated Effects Mean Group (CCE-MG) Estimates - Dependent
Variable: Cash Ratio 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variables  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept  0.119***  0.114***  0.116***  
   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00]   
CORR   -0.031***  -0.022***  -0.019***  
   [0.01]   [0.00]   [0.00]   
Donations     -0.019***  -0.014*** 
      [0.00]   [0.00] 
Gifts      -0.011***  -0.009*** 
      [0.00]   [0.01] 
Hiring      -0.005*  -0.002 
      [0.10]   [0.18] 
Payments     -0.033***  -0.030*** 
      [0.00]   [0.00] 
HHI         -0.074*** 
         [0.00] 
MBV         0.016*** 
         [0.00] 
CF         0.037*** 
         [0.00] 
NWC         -0.093*** 
         [0.00] 
CAP      -0.291*** 




Variables  Model (1) Model (2)  Model (3)   
Table 1 continued 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variables  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
TA      -0.007 
     [0.31] 
RD     -0.042*** 
     [0.00] 
ACQ     -0.186*** 
     [0.00] 
SIGMA     0.008** 
     [0.04] 
DIV     -0.040*** 
     [0.01] 
NI     0.015*** 
     [0.00] 
AGE     0.010* 
     [0.09] 
INV     -0.362*** 
     [0.00] 
PC     0.052** 
     [0.03] 
POP     0.010*** 
     [0.01] 
NDI     0.012*** 
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NEI     0.004* 
     [0.08] 
HQ     0.065*** 
     [0.00] 
UN     0.004 
     [0.28] 
No. of observations    76,439  76,439   76,439 
Adj. R-squared           0.13  0.41   0.54 

















Variables  Model (1) Model (2)  Model (3)   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variables  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept  0.214***  0.186***  0.172***  
   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00]   
CORR   0.035***  0.030***  0.024***  
   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00]   
Donations     0.024***  0.022*** 
      [0.00]   [0.00] 
Gifts      0.009***  0.007*** 
      [0.00]   [0.00] 
Hiring      0.003*   0.002* 
      [0.10]   [0.10] 
Payments     0.039***  0.036*** 
      [0.00]   [0.00] 
MBV         0.003 
         [0.21] 
SALES        0.023*** 
         [0.00] 
Z         -0.023*** 
         [0.00] 
EBITDA      -0.018*** 
     [0.00] 
PC     -0.010* 






POP     -0.017*** 
     [0.00] 
UN     -0.003 
     [0.30] 
No. of observations    76,439  76,439   76,439 
Adj. R-squared           0.21  0.38   0.46 















System-GMM Estimates - Dependent Variable: Cash Ratio 
_____________________________________________________________________ 





Variables  Model (1) Model (2)  Model (3)   
Intercept  0.103***  0.107***  0.108***  
   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00]   
CORR   -0.027***  -0.018***  -0.016***  
   [0.00]   [0.01]   [0.01]   
Donations     -0.016***  -0.012*** 
      [0.00]   [0.00] 
Gifts      -0.010***  -0.006** 
      [0.00]   [0.03] 
Hiring      -0.008*  -0.000 
      [0.09]   [0.24] 
Payments     -0.030***  -0.028*** 
      [0.00]   [0.00] 
HHI         -0.068*** 
         [0.00] 
MBV         0.014*** 
         [0.00] 
CF         0.032*** 
         [0.00] 
NWC         -0.082*** 
         [0.00] 
CAP      -0.274*** 






TA      -0.004 
     [0.40] 
RD     -0.038*** 
     [0.00] 
ACQ     -0.164*** 
     [0.00] 
SIGMA     0.005* 
     [0.07] 
DIV     -0.036*** 
     [0.00] 
NI     0.012** 
     [0.02] 
AGE     0.007* 
     [0.10] 
INV     -0.346*** 
     [0.00] 
PC     0.046** 
     [0.05] 
POP     0.007** 
     [0.03] 
NDI     0.010*** 





Model (1)  Model (2) Model (3)   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
NEI     0.001 
     [0.16] 
HQ     0.058*** 
     [0.00] 
UN     0.004 
     [0.26] 
No. of observations    76,439  76,439   76,439 
Adj. R-squared           0.11 
Arellano-Bond test  
  0.38   0.50 
for AR(1)                    [0.15] 
Arellano-Bond test  
      [0.17]   [0.19] 
for AR(2)                    [0.22]       [0.26]   [0.40] 
Hansen test                 [0.41] 
Difference 
      [0.46]   [0.39] 
Hansen test                 [0.55]       [0.47]   [0.62] 










Variables     
Table 4 
System-GMM Estimates - Dependent Variable: Leverage 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variables  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept  0.192***  0.171***  0.159***  
   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00]   
CORR   0.032***  0.026***  0.022***  
   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00]   
Donations     0.020***  0.019*** 
      [0.00]   [0.01] 
Gifts      0.005**  0.006** 
      [0.03]   [0.02] 
Hiring      0.003*   0.000 
      [0.09]   [0.16] 
Payments     0.035***  0.033*** 
      [0.00]   [0.00] 
MBV         0.000 
         [0.30] 
SALES        0.021*** 
         [0.01] 
Z         -0.019*** 
         [0.01] 
EBITDA      -0.016** 
     [0.02] 
PC     -0.007* 
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     [0.10] 
Table 4 
Model (1)  Model (2) Model (3)   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
POP     -0.015*** 
     [0.01] 
UN     -0.001 
     [0.38] 
No. of observations    76,439  76,439   76,439 
Adj. R-squared           0.19 
Arellano-Bond test  
 0.36   0.42 
for AR(1)                    [0.18] 
Arellano-Bond test  
      [0.22]   [0.26] 
for AR(2)                    [0.27]       [0.30]   [0.48] 
Hansen test                 [0.44] 
Difference 
      [0.51]   [0.44] 
Hansen test                 [0.59]       [0.52]   [0.68] 












Variables     
Common Correlated Effects Mean Group (CCE-MG) Estimates - Dependent 
Variable: 
Cash Ratio – The Role of Ethnic Background 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variables  Model (2)  Model (3)   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept  0.106***  0.102***   
   [0.00]   [0.01]    
CORR   -0.018***  -0.013***   
   [0.00]   [0.01]    
Donations  -0.014***  -0.010*** 
   [0.00]   [0.01] 
Gifts   -0.007**  -0.006** 
   [0.03]   [0.03] 
Hiring   -0.002   -0.000 
   [0.16]   [0.029] 
Payments  -0.027***  -0.028*** 
   [0.00]   [0.00] 
HHI      -0.064*** 
      [0.00] 
MBV      0.010*** 
      [0.01] 
CF      0.031*** 
      [0.00] 
NWC      -0.078*** 
      [0.00] 
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CAP   -0.226*** 
  [0.00] 
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Table 5 continued 
_____________________________________________________________________
Variables  Model (2)     
Model (3)
_____________________________________________________________________
TA   -0.002 
  [0.42] 
RD  -0.035*** 
  [0.00] 
ACQ  -0.150*** 
  [0.00] 
SIGMA  0.003* 
  [0.07] 
DIV  -0.031*** 
  [0.01] 
NI  0.011*** 
  [0.01] 
AGE  0.006 
  [0.20] 
INV  -0.335*** 
  [0.00] 
PC  0.039** 
  [0.04] 
POP  0.005* 
  [0.06] 
NDI  0.007** 




Table 5 continued 
_____________________________________________________________________
Variables  Model (2)     
_____________________________________________________________________
NEI  0.000 
  [0.16] 
HQ  0.054*** 
  [0.01] 
UN  0.001 
  [0.35] 
Donations x dumCH  -0.024***  -0.021*** 
   [0.00]   [0.01] 
Donations x IND -0.006   -0.007 
   [0.16]   [0.15] 
Donations x KO -0.001   -0.000 
   [0.26]   [0.30] 
Donations x dumRUS -0.000   -0.000 
   [0.31]   [0.31] 
Donations x dumHIS  -0.024**  -0.022** 
   [0.05]   [0.05] 
Donations x dumVIET-0.002   -0.001 
   [0.24]   [0.28] 
Donations x dumAS  -0.059***  -0.052*** 







Table 5 continued 
_____________________________________________________________________
Variables  Model (2)     
_____________________________________________________________________
Gifts x dumCH  -0.008*  -0.005 
   [0.10]   [0.18] 
Gifts x IND   -0.009*  -0.007* 
   [0.08]   [0.10] 
Gifts x KO   -0.000   -0.000 
   [0.42]   [0.39] 
Gifts x dumRUS  -0.010*  -0.008* 
   [0.09]   [0.10] 
Gifts x dumHIS  -0.003   -0.000 
   [0.21]   [0.27] 
Gifts x dumVIET  -0.012*  -0.010* 
   [0.07]   [0.08] 
Gifts x dumAS  -0.017**  -0.016** 
   [0.05]   [0.05] 
Hiring x dumCH  -0.001   -0.000 
   [0.27]   [0.39] 
Hiring x IND   -0.001   -0.000 
   [0.35]   [0.42] 
Hiring x KO   -0.000   -0.000 
   [0.36]   [0.39] 
Hiring x dumRUS  -0.001   -0.000 









Hiring x dumHIS  -0.000   -0.000 
   [0.28]   [0.32] 
Hiring x dumVIET  -0.001   -0.001 
   [0.17]   [0.16] 
Hiring x dumAS  -0.003*  -0.004* 
   [0.09]   [0.08] 
Payments x dumCH  -0.069***  -0.052*** 
   [0.00]   [0.01] 
Payments x IND  -0.025*  -0.019* 
   [0.04]   [0.05] 
Payments x KO  -0.010   -0.006 
   [0.17]   [0.24] 
Payments x dumRUS  -0.041**  -0.038** 
   [0.03]   [0.04] 
Payments x dumHIS  -0.029**  -0.026** 
                                    [0.05]  [0.05] 
Payments x dumVIET-0.020*  -0.018* 
                                    [0.09]      [0.10] 
Payments x dumAS  -0.093***  -0.086*** 
                                    [0.00]      [0.00] 
No. of observations    76,439  76,439   76,439 
Adj. R-squared           0.16  0.48   0.59 
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Variables  Model (2) Model (3)   
Common Correlated Effects Mean Group (CCE-MG) Estimates - Dependent 
Variable: 
Leverage - The Role of Ethnic Background 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variables  Model (2)  Model (3)   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept  0.149***  0.131***   
   [0.00]   [0.00]    
CORR   0.028***  0.020***   
   [0.00]   [0.01]    
Donations  0.022***  0.019*** 
   [0.00]   [0.00] 
Gifts   0.006**  0.005** 
   [0.04]   [0.05] 
Hiring   0.000   0.001 
   [0.19]   [0.22] 
Payments  0.035***  0.032*** 
   [0.00]   [0.00] 
MBV      0.000 
      [0.37] 
SALES     0.020*** 
      [0.00] 
Z      -0.017** 
      [0.03] 
EBITDA   -0.015*** 
  [0.00] 
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PC  -0.007* 




POP  -0.014*** 
  [0.01] 
UN  -0.001 
  [0.39] 
Donations x dumCH  0.029***  0.025*** 
   [0.00]   [0.00] 
Donations x IND 0.010*   0.008* 
   [0.09]   [0.10] 
Donations x KO  0.001   0.000 
   [0.34]   [0.39] 
Donations x dumRUS 0.004   0.003 
   [0.40]   [0.35] 
Donations x dumHIS  0.019*   0.016* 
   [0.08]   [0.09] 
Donations x dumVIET0.002   0.000 
   [0.36]   [0.41] 
Donations x dumAS  0.028**  0.026** 
   [0.04]   [0.04]  
Gifts x dumCH  0.020*   0.015* 











Variables   Model (3)   
Table 6 
Model (2)  
_____________________________________________________________________
Gifts x IND   0.018*   0.017* 
   [0.08]   [0.08] 
Gifts x KO   0.002   0.000 
   [0.33]   [0.39] 
Gifts x dumRUS  0.017*   0.015* 
   [0.09]   [0.09] 
Gifts x dumHIS  0.000   0.000 
   [0.39]   [0.46] 
Gifts x dumVIET  0.016*   0.015* 
   [0.10]   [0.10] 
Gifts x dumAS  0.024**  0.021* 
   [0.05]   [0.06] 
Hiring x dumCH  0.002   0.000 
   [0.31]   [0.37] 
Hiring x IND   0.000   0.000 
   [0.29]   [0.34] 
Hiring x KO   0.000   0.000 
   [0.46]   [0.52] 
Hiring x dumRUS  0.001   0.000 
   [0.31]   [0.35] 




Variables  Model (2) Model (3)   





Hiring x dumVIET  0.001   0.000 
   [0.35]   [0.41] 
Hiring x dumAS  0.023*   0.018* 
   [0.07]   [0.09] 
Payments x dumCH  0.049**  0.040** 
   [0.03]   [0.05] 
Payments x IND  0.023*   0.020* 
   [0.08]   [0.09] 
Payments x KO  0.014*   0.014* 
   [0.09]   [0.10] 
Payments x dumRUS  0.035**  0.031** 
   [0.03]   [0.04] 
Payments x dumHIS   0.043***  0.040*** 
                                    [0.01]  [0.01] 
Payments x dumVIET 0.036**  0.031** 
                                    [0.03]  [0.04] 
Payments x dumAS    0.063***  0.058*** 
                                     [0.00]  [0.00] 
No. of observations    76,439  76,439    




Variables   Model (3)   
Note. ***: p≤0.01; **: p≤0.05; *: p≤0.10. 
 
